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Cooperative advanced driver 
assistance systems 
Technological measures for data privacy compliance 
Informational self-determination, digital signature, Car-to-X communication, Big Data analysis
Cooperative advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) will contribute to road traffic safety: Critical 
situations will be detected, the driver alerted and control of the vehicle interfered with automatically. 
However, the introduction of such driver assistance systems presupposes that data privacy issues have 
already been solved in advance. A necessary condition for the driver to accept and trust new driver 
assistance systems is that his/her personal and personally identifiable data will be treated with a high 
level of integrity. 
Authors: Hubert Jaeger, Lars Schnieder
This article presents an approach to maintaining a high level of integrity in dealing with this data.
Weighting rivaling legal interests 
Technological implementation of coopera-
tive advanced driver assistance systems 
(ADAS) reveals two rivaling legal interests: 
1. The protective effect of active safety sys-
tems and, accordingly, the individual 
right to life and physical integrity (see 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights)
2. The right to informational self-determi-
nation (see EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights)
Protective effect of ADAS
The United Nations’ Decade of Action for 
Road Safety campaign goal is to reduce traf-
fic accidents worldwide by 50 % by 2020. 
Reaching or even exceeding this target (i.e. 
“Vision Zero”), requires a comprehensive 
integrated traffic safety work plan (Ahrens, 
et al., 2010). Advanced driver assistance sys-
tems play a major role in achieving this 
objective. Ahrens distinguishes three differ-
ent levels of ADAS:
1. Systems that recognize a vehicle’s move-
ment and compare it with the driver’s 
intentions (anti-lock braking systems)
2. Systems that additionally use environ-
ment-related data provided by the vehi-
cle’s sensors (lane keeping assistance sys-
tems, LKAS)
3. Systems whose sensors also provide the 
vehicle with otherwise inaccessible 
information (front collision warning sys-
tems, FCWS) (Franke, et al., 2013)
Vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infra-
structure (V2I) communication will allow 
all motorists to “cooperate” (Köster, 2014). 
This will improve traffic flow and increase 
traffic safety. 
Right to informational self-determination
Dedicated Short Range Communication 
(DSRC) according to ETSI ITS G5 stand-
ards sends information on traffic light signal 
times or existent traffic regulations (e.g. 
speed limits). Besides merely transferring 
data for the respective use cases, it is essen-
tial that deliberate falsification or manipula-
tion of the signals sent be prevented. As a 
basic principle all vehicles and traffic light 
control units need to be protected against 
manipulative information and any kind of 
attacks. Figure 1 illustrates intelligent traffic 
system attack vectors. Said protection 
should comply with process and technical 
specification defined per international 
standards for programmable traffic control 
and surveillance application system devel-
opment (DIN, 2008) and functional road 
vehicle safety (ISO, 2011).
Technical solutions are based on sys-
tems in which outgoing communication is 
equipped with a digital signature, the valid-
ity of which is verified on the recipient side. 
This requires taking technical and organi-
zational measures for certification and, in 
case of doubt, revocation of the same. Cur-
rent communication protocol specifies 
cyclic codes for cooperative advanced 
driver assistance systems use cases (Köster, 
2014). The cooperative ADAS transmits 
said codes, which categorically include per-
sonally identifiable information (i. e. vehi-
cle ID) at intervals of a few seconds as well 
as use-case-relevant parameters, such as 
speed, direction and location of the 
 motorist:
•	 Cooperative Awareness Messages 
(CAMs) convey information on the pres-
ence, whereabouts, speed, sensor data 
and current status of communicating, 
neighboring ITS stations. These are used 
for instance to warn drivers of potential 
collisions at intersections.
•	 Decentralized Environmental Notifica-
tion Messages (DENMs) send situation-
specific local hazard warnings (Franke, 
et al., 2013). A typical use case is a road 
hazard warning, which consists of multi-
ple applications. 
The data sent from ITS station to ITS 
station is not only applicable to the initially 
intended purpose of driver assistance. This 
data may also be used for tasks of public 
authorities, e.g. authorized criminal investi-
gation or prosecution of speed limit viola-
tions or similar (Rannenberg, 2015). This 
allows driver profiles or “digital traffic tick-
ets” to be issued. On the one hand, digital 
signatures enable authentication. On the 
other hand, they represent personal and 
personally identifiable data or much less 
distinguishing marks that can potentially 
reveal a communication partner’s identity. 
Consequently, from the point of view of pri-
vacy legislation, communication of car-
identifying signatures of the transmitted 
messages should be viewed critically. After 
all, such administrative interference with 
the right to informational self-determina-
tion requires a purpose or basis for author-
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ity regulated by law, i.e. an enabling provi-
sion (Kost, et al., 2013).
Privacy law framework
Advanced driver assistance systems support 
and inform the drivers and increasingly 
relieve them of certain tasks. According to 
Bendel (2014), this raises information ethics 
questions. Personal rights and interests 
should be understood, respected and 
observed when information technology is 
applied. Information ethics groups empha-
size the importance of protecting and pre-
serving informational autonomy under 
ADAS. Accordingly, ethical standards have 
been set out in writing in relevant legal 
standards and legislation (e. g. Directive 
95/46/EC). Each individual has the right to 
command and determine their own person-
ally identifiable data. Since implementing 
and using intelligent traffic system (ITS) 
applications and services implies processing 
personally identifiable data (EU, 2010), pro-
tecting data privacy interests is imperative.
Principle of proportionality
The latter also means that any action of the 
authorities must remain commensurable 
and observe the principle of proportionality. 
This rule of law (“prohibition of dispropor-
tionate measures”) is statutory and for 
example laid down in the German Constitu-
tion. ”Proportionate” (i.e. commensurate) 
implies that any action taken by the author-
ities must be appropriate, necessary and rea-
sonable as to the purpose to be served (Keil, 
2014). A measure is defined as appropriate if 
it serves to achieve the set objective. It is 
considered “necessary” if deemed the “mild-
est” of all adequate measures and “reason-
able” if and when proportionate with the 
objective pursued. Consequently, EU ITS 
Directives (EU, 2010) stipulate that per-
sonal and personally identifiable data may 
merely be processed if and when necessary 
for ITS application and service operation.
Principle of special-purpose use
The principle of special-purpose use pursu-
ant to the relevant EU Directive (EU, 2010) 
is also valid for ITS applications. The men-
tioned principle indicates that the right to 
informational self-determination may 
merely be restricted to the “inevitable”. The 
special-purpose principle stipulates that the 
acquisition, use and storage of personally 
identifiable data may only be ascertained for 
specifically defined, explicit legitimate pur-
poses. Moreover, further processing (i.e. use, 
modification, linkage and storage) of per-
sonal data is only admissible to the extent 
that it remains reconcilable with the respec-
tive special purpose (Rannenberg, 2015). 
The period and amount of data that may be 
processed is strictly limited to the amount 
needed to achieve the given objective (Keil, 
2014) (Douma et al., 2012). 
Resulting challenges for privacy-compliant 
Big Data analysis
The aforementioned elementary principles 
of proportionality and special-purpose use 
span the fields of activity shown in figure 2. 
As shown in the bottom left corner, in the 
worst-case neither objective is achieved. At 
best (top right), both objectives are fulfilled. 
However, the party amenable to law (the 
official investigative authority) must comply 
with the data subject’s rights. The person 
concerned must be informed, has the right 
to delete or block data, and the right to 
objection (Douma et al., 2012). Compliance 
with regulations concerning the data sub-
ject’s consent to processing of personal data 
(EU, 2010) must also be observed, provided 
that there is no legitimate purpose regulated 
by law. In cases where a large quantity of 
data is consolidated, a specific explanation 
as to its purpose and processing or use is 
required. If the data subject does not effec-
tively consent to the processing and use of 
his/her data, so-called “reasonable initial 
suspicion” postulates the existence of at least 
“sufficient actual” evidence, to be able to 
presume a criminal offence or misdemeanor. 
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Figure 1: Intelligent traffic system (ITS) attack vectors 
Figure 2: The 
special-purpose and 
proportionality 
challenge
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According to the European Court of Jus-
tice (ECJ), storage of Big Data is irreconcil-
able with the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. Also the German Federal Constitu-
tional Court’s First Senate has declared data 
retention to be altogether “unconstitutional 
and null and void by law”, ordering that data 
stored to date be deleted with immediate 
effect. In its court opinion the court frames 
material, organizational and procedural 
specifications regarding data storage, trans-
fer and usage: It must be assured that secu-
rity standards reflect the technical discus-
sion’s development, continuously incorpo-
rate the latest scientific findings and 
insights, and are not subject to the free 
weighing of economic interests (Federal 
Constitutional Court decision dated 
3/2/2010, 1 BvR 256/08).
In the following, we introduce a technol-
ogy that ensures the protection of the 
authorities’ interests pertaining to the 
aforementioned legal principles.
Sealed Freeze and Sealed Analytics 
solutions
Both technical solutions, Sealed Freeze 
(data-privacy-compliant data retention) and 
Sealed Analytics (compliant Big Data) are 
based on the fact that the potential of Big 
Data may only be used if any risk of uncon-
trolled data distribution and data abuse is 
eliminated. A combination of intelligent 
technologies, updated applicable law and 
technical regulations can ensure this. The 
data privacy technology mentioned herein 
allows performing Big Data analyses while 
maintaining a high level of integrity when 
dealing with personally identifiable data 
(Rieken, et al., 2015). 
Storage in a sealed environment
The sealing technology is based on the fact 
that only specifically defined and techni-
cally verifiable parties can access data. 
Access control specifies who may work with 
personally identifiable data to what extent. 
Since provider staff cannot access Sealed 
Cloud data at any time (Jäger et al., 2013), a 
“key generator” is necessary to create a vast 
amount of asymmetrical pairs of keys. Pub-
lic keys can then be exported to where the 
data is collected, in order to encrypt the data 
block-wise. Private keys, which are neces-
sary for decryption, are stored per multi-
redundant, yet (merely volatile) random-
access memory (RAM) within the Sealed 
Cloud. This type of storage ensures, via 
Sealed Cloud security, that no one can 
access unencrypted storage data, neither 
per authorized nor per unauthorized access. 
Planned access, e.g. during maintenance, or 
unplanned access, such as cyber attacks, 
triggers an alarm and automatic data clean-
up. 
Sealed Freeze and Sealed Analytics access per 
policy gate
The core characteristic of the technology is 
that access to data stored in this manner is 
granted technically, i.e. by a set of fixed rules 
(policy) specified in advance (Kost, et al., 
2013). Said policies are subject to data pri-
vacy specification. Consequently, differing 
individual policies may be created for Big 
Data. These are subject to a three-layer for-
mula:
•	 The first level of protection fulfils the 
minimum legal requirements of data pri-
vacy law.
•	 The second level includes supplemen-
tary data privacy specifications cove-
nanted with the user.
•	 The third level of protection is a particu-
larly commendable example of imple-
mentation of the principles of data pri-
vacy, e.g. in terms of data austerity or 
privacy by design (Douma, et al., 2012).
A judicial decision, i. e. court order, is the 
condition precedent for a person to be 
authorized access to personal or personally 
identifiable data. Client certificates can ver-
ify an authorized party’s identity with cer-
tainty, since they are allocated to specific 
devices. If an authorized party must access 
personal data or metadata for investigative 
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Figure 3: Sealed Freeze application components
Analytics processor
S
ea
le
d 
A
na
ly
tic
s
Public key
ITS storage
Policy gate
Key generator
(RAM only)
S
ea
le
d 
Fr
ee
ze
ITS use
Encrypted data
Private keys
if Policy fulfilled
Trigger & output
Party authorized 
by law
Private keys
if Policy fulfilled
Anonymized or
cleared output
© Uniscon GmbH
Figure 4: Privacy compliance for Big Data via Sealed Analytics
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purposes, then this is merely feasible via 
policy gate. The policy gate implements a 
logic that is strictly modifiable for version-
ing only. Reverse modification of the logic is 
impossible. Figure 3 illustrates the afore-
mentioned Sealed Freeze components. 
Sealed Analytics
Sealed Analytics technology is based on the 
above principle and enables specific, court-
ordered analysis of data, provided that the 
corresponding semantics are allocated prior 
to storage and a set of metadata has been 
accumulated. Accordingly, specific rights 
allocation allows authorized parties access 
to specific data. Said authorized parties are 
also only granted access to personally iden-
tifiable data that is needed to perform the 
respective task. Up-front policy specifica-
tion allows access criteria to be defined indi-
vidually. For example, access might be 
granted for specific data types only, or lim-
ited periods of time, limited data volumes, 
and specific types of traffic or usage rights. 
Any access that is not intended for special-
purpose or court-ordered use is denied. 
Modification of a policy is possible yet inef-
fective in case of existing data. The modified 
policy only kicks in after the moment of 
modification, i.e. with future data. Hence, 
Sealed Analytics ensures better data privacy. 
Figure 4 illustrates how Sealed Analytics 
ensures privacy compliance for Big Data.
Auditing as accompanying organizational 
measure
Impartial, independent auditing ensures 
methodical, documented examination of a 
system. It determines whether quality- 
reliant activity and concomitant analysis is 
conducted according to specification and 
meets the set objectives (audit criteria). A 
successful audit fulfils specific criteria and 
conforms to defined requirements. It also 
implicates two separate procedures that 
complement each other: A static audit eval-
uates something according to “handbook”. 
It analyzes whether process documentation 
meets the set standards specified therein. In 
contrast, dynamic audits (illustrated in fig-
ure 5) go much further. The latter consist in 
continuous system testing.
Conclusion and outlook
Cooperative advanced driver assistance sys-
tems based on Car-to-X communication will 
improve road traffic security considerably. 
For large-scale application, consumers have 
to be convinced that these systems improve 
traffic safety and convenience alike. At the 
same time, information ethics and legal 
requirements must also be considered. 
Hence it is imperative that all data is han-
dled with integrity. Sealed Analytics ensures 
overall compliance and privacy protection 
of Big Data from road traffic. It comprehen-
sively safeguards personally identifiable ITS 
data against abuse, unauthorized access, 
manipulation and theft. After all, the 
described technology ensures data privacy 
observant, compliant analysis, i.e. the sine 
qua non of political and public acceptance. ■
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Figure 5: Dynamic audit
